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a b s t r a c t
Using Gröbner bases for the construction of public key cryptosys-
tems has been often attempted, but has always failed.
We review the reason for these failures, and show that only
ideals generated by binomials may give a successful cryptosystem.
As a consequence, we concentrate on binomial ideals that
correspond to Euclidean lattices. We show how to build a
cryptosystem based on lattice ideals and their Gröbner bases, and,
after breaking a simple variant, we construct a more elaborate
one. In this variant the trapdoor information consists in a ‘‘small’’
change of coordinates that allows one to recover a ‘‘fat’’ Gröbner
basis. While finding a change of coordinates giving a fat Gröbner
basis is a relatively easy problem, finding a small one seems to be
a hard optimization problem.
This paper develops the details and proofs related to computer
algebra, the cryptographic details related to security, the compari-
son with other lattice cryptosystems and discusses the implemen-
tation.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Cryptology basically has two aspects: cryptography, i.e. the design of ciphers or other crypto-
graphic protocols, and cryptanalysis, i.e. attempts to recover the message without the knowledge of
the secret key, or to recover the secret key itself.
Since every cryptosystem can be expressed as a set of polynomial equations, Gröbner bases have
been increasingly used as a cryptanalytic tool, and after some striking success on long standing
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challenges, see e.g. Faugère and Joux (2003), are now regarded as a standard tool in algebraic
cryptanalysis, see Cid and Weinmann (2009).
Using Gröbner bases to build cryptosystems has been attempted, but has not been successful. The
reason has been explained, accounting for the failures of the authors themselves, in Barkee et al.
(1994), (the hiding authors are indeed the ‘‘scientist who failed’’) and their prophecy has proved to be
true up to now. In Levy-dit-Vehel et al. (2009) these attempts, collectively known under the name of
Polly Cracker (Fellows and Koblitz, 1993; Levy-dit-Vehel and Perret, 2004; Ackermann and Kreuzer,
2006; Ly, 2006), have been analyzed, together with the attacks that have broken them. The conclusion
has been that there is still no hope of creating a satisfying cipher on these lines with the possible
exception of binomial ideals. This possibility has been partially developed in Caboara et al. (2008),
which contains moreover a first prototype of a cryptosystem based on Gröbner bases of lattices. We
called this cryptosystem Lattice Polly Cracker (LPC).
In this paper we elaborate the cryptanalytic tool for Polly Cracker cryptosystems extending the
differential attack of Hofheinz and Steinwandt (2002) already sketched in Levy-dit-Vehel et al. (2009)
and Caboara et al. (2008). We build a cryptosystem scheme using Gröbner bases of lattices, extending
and reinforcing the one sketched in Caboara et al. (2008), and discuss the lattice attacks that can
recover the private key or an equivalent one in the simple version and fail because of the algorithmic
complexity beyond the simplest cases in the extended version.
It turns out that the fundamental element onwhich the security of LPC relies is not, as one expected,
the difficulty of computing a Gröbner basis. This is an easy computation for zero-dimensional lattice
ideals (binomial ideals associated to a lattice ofmaximal rank) if one is allowed to choose the ordering.
And the task of finding a Gröbner basis suitable for the decryption is as difficult for the designer of an
instance of the cryptosystem as for the attacker, hence not crucial for the security; showing that, after
all, Barkee et al. (1994) was right also in this case. The trapdoor information is a change of variables
that transforms the private lattice into the public lattice (the public key is a Lex Gröbner basis of the
public lattice).
Retrieving such a change of variables from the public key means finding an integer solution of a
non-linear system of equations and inequalities, which seems to be very hard both in theory and in
practice.
Note that the resulting cryptosystem, relying on hard lattice problems, seems to be secure against
quantum computing attacks, hence it is an example of a Post Quantum Cryptography protocol, see
Bernstein et al. (2008).
2. Polly Cracker, and why it fails
Polly Cracker is the common name for a series of cryptosystems using Gröbner bases as trapdoor
information (Ackermann and Kreuzer, 2006).
The key pair is a pair of ideals in a multivariate polynomial ring, J ⊆ I ⊆ k[X], in which a Gröbner
basis G of I is secretly known, and a Gröbner basis of J is hard to compute, for example hard in space or
even infinite (in the non-commutative case). The set of messagesM is a vector space of polynomials
generated by a subset of the staircase of I , R is a subset of J and a message m ∈ M is encrypted as
m+ r , with r ∈ R. Decryption is made computing the normal form modulo G.
The special case that was initially considered in Fellows and Koblitz (1993) is the case that I is a
maximal ideal corresponding to a solution of a set of polynomial equations generating J . Choosing a
system of equationsmodelling anNP-complete problemwas assumed to guarantee the security of the
cryptosystem. Note that Fellows and Koblitz (1993) is simultaneous to Barkee et al. (1994), and is not
directly broken by their analysis, so the authors can be considered, at the time of the paper, rather as
‘‘scientists that have not yet failed’’, and indeed some interaction between the two can be discovered
in the formulation of the ‘‘challenge’’ on one side, and on some considerations in Koblitz (1998) on the
other side.
The assumption hides a double fallacy. First, NP-completeness (under the P ≠ NP hypothesis)
guarantees security only asymptotically and in worst case, while cryptographic security requires
intractability in a random, finite case (but some proposals have been able to overcome this difficulty,
see e.g. Levy-dit-Vehel and Perret (2004)). Second, and more importantly, message attacks do not
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require the solution of a generic normal form problem, but only of a normal form of a message that
has been built in bounded timewith a predefined procedure. Side attacks to the encryption procedure,
i.e. attacks that recover how the random r has been built from the information available in the public
key, are possible.
In particular, if the polynomials generating J are sufficiently dense, either a truncated Gröbner
basis can be computed (the Fantômas attack of Barkee et al. (1994)) or linear algebra in polynomials
of bounded degree (Moriarty attack) can be used. If the polynomial ring has many variables or the
polynomials are of high degree then the direct application of linear algebra is infeasible, but some
formof the differential attack of Hofheinz and Steinwandt (2002) can recover a small support inwhich
sparse linear algebra will then be successful. We will detail this last method in the next section.
These attacks, or similar ones, have defeated all the Polly Cracker variants proposed up to now. See
Levy-dit-Vehel et al. (2009) for an update.
3. The differential and the 2-nomial attacks
The differential attack of Hofheinz and Steinwandt (2002) has been used successfully in several
variants of Polly Cracker, exploiting the sparsity of the generators fi of the public ideal J .
The cryptogram is c = m + r = m +∑ gifi (where m and the gi are not known) and we can
expand it formally as
∑
aαmα+∑ biβγ gi,β fi,γ where each term is amonomial. Because of the sparsity,
one expects that cancellations are sporadic, hence in the result at least two monomials of one of the
fi, multiplied by one of the monomials of one of the gi, will appear. We can then subtract from c a
suitablemonomial multiple of fi and proceed inductively. If everything goeswell at the endwe are left
withm.
This does not work if some of the fi have just one or twomonomials (such polynomials are called 2-
nomials). In the case that one can find several 2-nomials in J , one can find more 2-nomials computing
the Gröbner basis of the ideal generated by them, and this has been sometimes sufficient to crack
some of the proposed cryptosystems, see Steinwandt et al. (2002).
The two attacks seem to apply to two completely different kinds of systems, but they can be
combined into one more powerful attack.
Indeed, when one has an ideal I of k[X] containing another ideal J , and one has a a Gröbner basis of
J , one can consider I as an ideal of k[X]/J that one can represent via linear algebra. In this case, if J is
generated by 2-nomials, k[X]/J is a vector space generated by the staircase of J , and multiplication is
performed as in the polynomial ring, but identifying some monomials either with 0 or with another
monomial being a multiple of a staircase element; hence a linear algebra attack, far from being more
difficult, is made easier.
One might try to conceal binomial elements of I inside of the generators, but these are easily
discovered, for example with a modified Buchberger algorithm that considers only those S-
polynomials where at least twomonomials cancel. This algorithm, in the very sparse case, will usually
stop quite soon, and possibly recover a few 2-nomials. Computing the Gröbner basis of the 2-nomial
part J one might either perform a linear algebra attack or restart the modified Buchberger algorithm
in k[X]/J .
The remaining hope is reduced to the difficulty of computing a Gröbner basis of a 2-nomial ideal; so
we turn now to the analysis of binomial ideals, which are a simplified form of 2-nomials independent
of the ground field, and are a better understood class, linking to different algebraic structures of
cryptographic interest.
4. Binomials and lattices
A 2-nomial of the form Xα − Xβ is called a binomial.1 An ideal generated by binomials is called a
binomial ideal, and its Gröbner basis, in whatever ordering, is composed of binomials. Here we report
1 As usual, if α = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Nn , Xα denotes∏ xαii .
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results that arewell known, refer to Bigatti et al. (1999). In the next sectionwe prove some less known
or even new results.
An integer lattice, lattice for short, is a subgroup L of Zn with the Euclidean distance inherited by
Zn. A lattice has a basis, which is usually represented as a matrix, whose rows are the elements of the
basis. The number of rows is the rank of the lattice; when the rank is n (the lattice is of full rank) this
matrix is square, and its determinant is the cardinality of Zn/L. A lattice described giving as basis the
rows of a matrix A is denoted by LA.
Lattices represented by matrices A, B are isomorphic (an isometric isomorphism exists) if and only
if integer square matrices X , Y exist such that A = XBY , where X has determinant ±1 and Y is a
permutationmatrix. X corresponds to a change of basis and Y corresponds to an orthogonal transform
of Zn.
Given a binomial ideal I , the set {α − β | Xα − Xβ ∈ I} ⊆ Zn is a lattice LI . Given a lattice
L, the ideal IL generated by {Xv+ − Xv−}, where v+, v− are non-negative with disjoint support and
v+ − v− ∈ L, is a binomial ideal. Moreover, LIL = L and ILI = I :∗ X , the saturation of I with respect to
the indeterminates.
Given a lattice L and a basis (vi) of L, it is not true that the ideal I(vi) generated by bi = Xvi,+ − Xvi,−
is equal to IL, but it is true that IL = I(vi) :∗ X .
A Gröbner basis of IL is composed of binomials; these binomials can be represented by vectors that
form a set of generators called the Gröbner basis of the lattice.
The staircase of a lattice L is defined as the staircase of the lattice ideal IL, and the normal form of a
non-negative vector that corresponds to amonomial is the unique element of the staircase equivalent
to it, modulo the lattice. If the lattice L is of full rank we can define the normal form for every vector,
since any vector is equivalent to a non-negative vector.
5. The lattice ring
Several properties of the lattice L correspond to algebraic properties of the lattice ideal IL and of
the lattice ring k[X]/IL. This object is not invariant under lattice isomorphism, so we study a slightly
different object, and prove that the two are isomorphic in the case of our interest, i. e. when the lattice
is of full rank.
The polynomial ring k[X] is a monoid algebra k[Nn], but a lattice L is not a submonoid of Nn, it is a
subgroup of Zn, hence the natural object to study L is the group algebra k[Zn]. We use the following
lemma:
Lemma 1. Let G be a group, H an invariant subgroup; consider the canonical map φ : k[G] → k[G/H];
then the kernel of φ is the ideal generated by the (g − g ′), where gH = g ′H.
Proof. It is indeed the k-vector space generated by the (g− g ′), since G and G/H are bases of k[G] and
k[G/H] respectively. 
Denote J(H) = kerφ. The following is immediate:
Lemma 2. If L is a lattice, then IL = JL ∩ k[X].
Proof. Multiplying any generator of JL by a suitable power product we obtain an element of IL. Recall
that IL is variable-saturated. 
If L is a lattice, L+ denotes the elements of L having positive coordinates.
Lemma 3. Let L be a full-rank lattice; then L+ is non-empty.
Proof. Note that L ⊗ Q ⊆ Zn ⊗ Q is equal to Qn; any totally positive element of Qn has hence an
integer multiple in L 
Corollary 4. Ifw1, w2 ∈ Zn then there exists v ∈ L such thatw1 + v,w2 + v have positive coordinates.
Any element of L can be represented as v1 − v2, vi ∈ L+.
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Corollary 5. The homomorphism k[X]/IL → k[Zn/L] is injective, and if L is a full-rank lattice, it is an
isomorphism.
Proof. The canonical homomorphism k[X]/IL → k[Zn]/JL is injective by Lemma 2 and surjective by
Corollary 4. 
To test ideal membership in IL it is hence sufficient to test zero equality in k[Zn/L]. This can be
computed using the following theorem:
Corollary 6. Let f =∑ aiXαi ∈ k[X]. Then f ∈ IL if and only if
∀i
−
αj−αi∈L
aj = 0.
Proof. Note that αj − αi ∈ Lmeans equality in Zn/L, and can be checked through linear algebra. Then
use Corollary 5. 
Theorem 7. Let L be a full-rank lattice, of determinant d; then the multiplicity of IL is equal to d.
Proof. The multiplicity for a zero-dimensional ideal is the k-dimension of k[X]/I . 
Theorem 8. Let A = (aij) be an integer square matrix, upper triangular, aii > 0 and assume that
−ajj < aij ≤ 0 if i < j. Then the rows of A are the reduced Lex Gröbner basis of the lattice L defined
by A.
Proof. Since the diagonal elements are positive, and the elements above the diagonal are non-
positive, the i-th row corresponds to the binomial xaiii −
∏
j>i x
aij
j . Since the ordering is Lex, the head
is xaiii . These elements are a Gröbner basis G, since the heads are pairwise coprime. We have to show
that G generates the ideal of the lattice.
The multiplicity of the ideal generated by G is
∏
aii, which is also the determinant of the lattice,
i.e. the cardinality of Zn/L. This proves that the ideal generated by G, which is contained in the ideal
of the lattice, coincides with it.
The inequalities−ajj < aij ≤ 0 prove that the tail of every element of G cannot be reduced by the
head of another element of G, hence G is a reduced Gröbner basis. 
If L is of full rank, then a Lex Gröbner basis of IL is easily computed from the Hermite Normal Form
(HNF) of L. Indeed, in this case the HNF is the unique upper-triangular matrix generating L such that
0 ≤ aij < aii if i < j, and the Lex basis is the unique upper-triangular matrix generating L such
that 0 ≥ aij > −aii if i < j. Passing from the one to the other form is immediate through Gaussian
reduction with straightforward row operations.
Note that the Hermite normal form can be computed in polynomial time, see Kannan and Bachem
(1979) and subsequent extensive literature on the subject, and efficient implementations are widely
available, e.g. Shoup (2009). Hence the computation of a Lex Gröbner basis of a full-rank lattice is
trivial up to several hundred variables.
To compute a Gröbner basis with other orderings may be much harder: experimentally the
DegRevLex Gröbner basis of an n × n random matrix with entries in [−20, 20] has approximately
3n elements, and the computation time required grows exponentially with respect to n. This of course
holds as far as experiments can go, i. e. for n ≤ 11.
6. Lattice Polly Cracker (basic version)
Polly Cracker for lattice ideals can be defined as in the general case, but some special properties of
lattice ideals require specific handling. Let L be a lattice and I = IL.
As in any binomial ideal, the normal form of a monomial is a monomial. Let f be a polynomial;
Corollary 6 allows one to find an f ′ equivalent to f modulo IL with the smallest support, aggregating in
one all the equivalent monomials. Then finding the normal form is equivalent to finding the normal
form of all the monomials.
M. Caboara et al. / Journal of Symbolic Computation 46 (2011) 534–549 539
This implies that encryption and decryption in a Polly Cracker based on a binomial ideal can be
made one monomial at a time, encrypting a monomial with another monomial, since encrypting one
monomial with many monomials does not increase the security.
This motivates the following preliminary definition of a cryptosystem that we call Lattice Polly
Cracker, or LPC:
• The set of messages is a subsetM = [0, s]n ⊆ Zn.
• The public key is a lattice L ⊆ Zn such that two different elements of M are not equivalent
modulo L.
• The encryption procedure replacesm ∈M withm+ l, l ∈ L.
• The private key is composed of a term ordering and a corresponding Gröbner basis G of L; the
staircase is assumed to containM.
• The decryption of a cryptogram c = m+ l is done by computing its normal form NF(c)modulo G.
The cryptosystemwill be generalized later, since the initial versionwill be insecure; this definition
will be only used to show that it is insecure, and to motivate the generalization, which will inherit the
name.
Some comments: it is possible to choose the set of messages differently: however, adaptingM to
the staircase might disclose details on the term ordering or on the Gröbner basis, hence M should
be invariant under the symmetric group. A subsetM′ ofM might be chosen to restrict messages for
security reasons; this will be discussed later.
The choice of l in the encryption procedure is largely irrelevant, since it is always possible to find
a normal form of a message from its encrypted form, for example through the round-off algorithm
(Babai, 1986) or through the Hermite normal form (Micciancio, 2001); this shows that for a practical
cryptosystem an additional layer should be added; this is however a standard cryptographic tool, and
will not be discussed here.
The key property that allows decryption is the fact that the staircase contains the message space.
The message space being [0, s]n, this is equivalent to requiring that (s, s, . . . , s) is in the staircase.
The condition that the messages are not equivalent mod L entails that the determinant d of L has to
be larger than the cardinality ofM, i. e. (s + 1)n; security considerations require that d is not much
larger than (s+ 1)n, e. g. not much more than 2n(s+ 1)n. These conditions make it difficult to provide
examples of an LPC. This however makes recovering a Gröbner basis suitable to decrypt messages
difficult too.
We will use informally the concept of fat and slim staircases. A staircase is fat (s-fat) if it contains
(s, s, . . . , s), and is hence suitable to be used in the decryption of an LPC, it is slim otherwise. Breaking
an LPC instance means finding a Gröbner basis of the public lattice whose staircase is fat.
7. Block lattices and their Gröbner bases
To instantiate a Polly Cracker system, it is necessary to have a lattice L, a basis A of the lattice, and
an ordering<L such that the Gröbner basis of L can be computed from A, and such that the staircase
is ‘‘fat’’ enough.
The first problem is the choice of a class of suitable term ordering. Lex orderings are inadequate,
since the staircase is usually slim for the larger variables, and forcing the lattice to have a fat Lex
staircase reduces its genericity to much. A DegRevLex ordering is usually impossible to compute for
a sufficiently large lattice. Our choice is to use block orderings, and we show that it is possible to
efficiently compute in practice a Gröbner basis of a lattice given through a block-triangular basis with
respect to a block ordering. A lattice with a block generatingmatrix and a block ordering will be called
a block lattice. Every lattice can be represented as a block lattice, since the Hermite normal form is a
block matrix.
Given a list of positive integers B = (b1, . . . , bm) and n = ∑ bi, let aj = ∑ji=1 bi (hence a0 = 0).
An n × n matrix L = (lr,s) is called a B-block triangular matrix (block matrix for short) if s ≤ ai < r
implies lr,s = 0. The submatrix (lr,s) with ai−1 < r, s ≤ ai is called the i-th diagonal block, and (lr,s)
with ai−1 < r ≤ ai ≤ s is called the i-th tail. The determinant d of the matrix is the product of the
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determinants di of the diagonal blocks. The list B is the block structure, and is usually (but not always)
taken as constant, i.e. bi = bj.
A B-block decomposition of a lattice L is an isomorphism of L with another L′ generated by a B-
block triangularmatrix. Substantially, thismeans giving a partition of the variables in B-blocks.We are
interested in finding block decompositionswith prescribedproperties, for example having an assigned
determinant for the diagonal blocks.
The difference between a block structure and a block decomposition is an operative one: we need
a block structure to compute with block matrices, we need to discover a block decomposition to be
able to compute on a lattice with block matrices, i. e. inductively on small blocks.
Remark 9. A block structure induces a filtrationM′ of Zn,M ′i = 0ai ⊕Zn−ai , and consequently a block
decomposition of a lattice L induces a filtration Li = L ∩ Mi and corresponding subgroups Mi/Li of
Zn/L, where theMi correspond to theM ′i with variables shuffled. The order of (Mi/Li)/(Mi+1/Li+1) is
the determinant di of the i-th diagonal block.
TheMi/Mi+1 are torsion-free; a torsion-free filtration of Zn induces a block decomposition up to a
(non-isometric) automorphism of Zn.
Given a block structure B and a vector v ≠ 0, we can split the entries of v in blocks according to B.
If i is the first non-zero block of v (from left to right) then the head of v, H(v), is a vector with as many
components as v, all zero except for the ith, which is equal to the ith component of v . The tail of v is
T (v) = v − H(v).
Associated with a block structure, we have a block ordering in the polynomial ring k[X]: power
products are compared considering the head of the difference. The comparison can be made via any
predefined term ordering for the individual blocks, but wewill usually adopt the DegRevLex ordering.
Remark 10. Given a block structure, a vector v and its corresponding polynomial pv = Xv+ − Xv− , if
the head of the vector has no negative component and the tail has no positive component, then the
leading monomial of pv corresponds to the head of v.
Theorem 11. Let B be a block structure with an associated block ordering, and A a B-block triangular
matrix. Let Gi = (gi,j) be the Gröbner basis of the i-th diagonal block Ai of A; then the reduced Gröbner
basis G of A is composed of vectors vi,j whose head corresponds to gi,j, and whose tail is a vector with
non-positive components.
Proof. We prove that vectors vi,j as detailed in the hypothesis are a Gröbner basis, and show how to
find them from A and the Gi via linear algebra. The uniqueness of a reduced Gröbner basis concludes
the proof.
Let Ai be the i-th diagonal block of A, let di = det Ai; note that∏ di = det A.
A set (fl) of polynomials of I is a Gröbner basis if and only if the monomial ideal generated by
the heads of the fl is equal to the initial ideal of I; if I is zero-dimensional it is enough to test that
the multiplicities are equal, see Traverso (1996). Since Gi is a Gröbner basis, the multiplicity of the
corresponding initial ideal is di, for Theorem7; since the tails of the vi,j have non-positive components,
the tail variables do not appear in the leading term, hence the multiplicity of In(vi,j), the initial ideal
of {vi,j}i,j, is∏ di = d, which is the determinant of A; hence vi,j is a Gröbner basis, again for Theorem 7.
It remains to show that such a set exists, and the theorem follows from the uniqueness of a reduced
Gröbner basis. We show how to obtain such a set via linear algebra.
Since the Gi is composed of vectors of the lattice generated by Ai, a matrix Ni exists such that
NiAi = Gi. Consider the matrix N composed of the diagonal blocks Ni; NA does not satisfy the non-
positivity assumption of the thesis, but with further elementary row operations this can be achieved
without modifying the blocks Gi. 
As a consequence, the staircase of a block lattice with respect to a block ordering is just the product
of the staircases of the diagonal blocks.
Although this theorem allows one to compute a Gröbner basis, it is seldom useful to compute one.
To compute the normal form of a vector modulo a block lattice it is enough to have the Gröbner bases
of the diagonal blocks.
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Let v be a vector, v = H(v) + T (v). First, find the normal form v¯ of H(v) modulo Ai; this can be
computed via Gi; note that it is not a lattice element, (since the rows of Ai are not rows of A) but we
can find a row vectorm such that v −mAi = v¯. Consider now A¯i, the submatrix of A composed of the
rows corresponding to the i-th block; the rows of A¯i are lattice elements, and v′ = v−mA¯i is a vector
equivalentmodulo A to v and having head v¯. Since v¯ cannot be reduced by any Gröbner basis element,
the normal form of v is v¯ + NF(v′ − v¯). Since v′ − v¯ has its head in a smaller block, inductively we
find the normal form of v.
We note, moreover, that to find the normal form of a vector v modulo a Gröbner basis, even one
that does not have a block structure, it is not necessary to proceed with Buchberger division from
the start; it is enough to find first a lattice vectorw ‘‘sufficiently close’’ to v, and perform Buchberger
division on v−w; for this, it is useful that v−w has non-negative components, hence one can add a
positive vector u to v, find an approximate closest vector w to u+ v, and look at v − w; if it still has
negative components, increase u. This heuristic procedure usually performs quite well.
8. Breaking the basic block LPC; Hermite and Smith normal form
Computing a Gröbner basis of a lattice is easy for certain (block) orderings: for example a Lex
Gröbner basis can be computed in polynomial time, and Lex is a block ordering for every block
structure. But not all such bases are useful: with very high probability the staircase of a randomly
chosen block ordering will not be fat enough to be used in an LPC.
Reordering the basis of Zn, or changing the basis of L, destroys the original block structure.
However, retrieving the block decomposition (which variables are in which block) of the private
key, although not enough to find the private key, is a big step forward. One still has to find the ordering
to be used inside the blocks, but this is a problem limited in few variables, and should hence be
considered feasible; when one can guess the original block decomposition, the private key should
be considered broken.
At first sight, retrieving the block decomposition is hard, since it looks like guessing a permutation
of n variables, n large, but it is not.Wewill show that the block decomposition of the variables is easily
guessed assuming that the block structure and the determinants di are known. This is plausible, since
the product di is the determinant d of the lattice and is known, the fatness s of the staircase is known
since it has to fit the messages, the blocks should be small (to allow the computation of the Gröbner
basis), each di has to be larger than (s+ 1)bi , and d has to be not much larger than (s+ 1)n (to ensure
the security against message attacks).
Lemma 12. Let L be a block lattice, and let dm be the determinant of the smallest block. Then for every
variable xi of the smallest block the polynomial x
dm
i − 1 is in the lattice ideal.
Proof. Consider the lattice Lm defined by the last block Am (a square matrix of dimension bm, hence
Lm ⊆ Zbm ); then Zbm/L is a group of order dm, hence every element has order dividing dm. Corollary 5
allows one to conclude. 
One can find for every variable a univariate polynomial, (e.g. by computing a Lex Gröbner basis)
whose head term is necessarily of the form xcii , and this usually reveals the block decomposition, since
variables contained in the i-th block are only forced to have order dividing di · . . . · dm, hence sorting
the variables in decreasing order usually gives the block decomposition. (It is possible to design block
matrices avoiding this kind of attack, but introducing this extra structure will most likely allow other
attacks).
Remark 13. To compute the order of all the variables, one can compute one Lex basis, i.e. one Hermite
normal form, for every variable. This however is an overkill. We can compute the order of any element
inZn/L by computing once the Smith normal form. Indeed, let A be a squarematrix corresponding to a
basis of the lattice, and let X , Y be invertible integer matrices such that XAY = ∆ is a diagonal matrix.
∆ defines a lattice L′, and Y defines an automorphism ofZn bringing L into L′. This automorphism does
not preserve the Euclideanmetric, since Y is not in general orthogonal; but computing the order of an
element in Zn/L′, which is explicitly a direct sum of cyclic groups, is immediate, and this is enough to
compute the order of any element.
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The same method allows one to compute L : c = {v ∈ Zn | cv ∈ L} for any c ∈ Z. It is just
sufficient to note that if L ⊆ Z then L = mZ, andmZ : c = dZ, d = m/GCD(d,m).
9. Lattice Polly Cracker
We have shown that to define a Lattice Polly Cracker we can use block matrices, but we have to
conceal the lattice block structure.
We tried first to conceal it by publishing only a sublattice, but this does not work, since the
sublattice inherits the block structure. The solution that we found is to conceal the block structure
through a change of coordinates, i. e. a (non-isometric) automorphism of Zn. The concept of a block
structure and block decomposition of a lattice is not invariant under group isomorphism.
We have hence a lattice L ⊆ Zn to be used for decryption and a lattice Lpub ⊆ Zn that is used for
encryption. They are connected through an automorphism φ of ZZn sending Lpub into L. Since φ is not
an isometry, the lattices are not isomorphic (hence for example a closest vector problem might give
different results).
This modification entails deeper modifications than just going back and forth from L to Lpub (or,
better, from Zn/L to Zn/Lpub) since we have to modify the decryption procedure.
We now give the final definition of a Lattice Polly Cracker cryptosystem:
• The set of messages is a subsetM = [0, s]n ⊆ Zn.
• The public key is a lattice Lpub ⊆ Zn such that two different elements of M are not equivalent
modulo Lpub.
• The encryption procedure replacesm ∈M withm+ l, l ∈ Lpub.
• The private key is composed of
. an automorphism φ Zn → Zn; let L = φ(Lpub).
. a term ordering and a Gröbner basis G of L.
. a shift vector τ such that φ(M)+ τ is contained in the staircase of L.
• To decrypt a cryptogram c = m+ lwe compute φ−1(−τ + NF(φ(c)+ τ)).
The basic LPC defined previously corresponds to the case when φ is orthogonal. The fundamental
difference is that now the set of messagesM in the private coordinates is no longer a cube [0, s]n, and
it is not even a set of vectors with non-negative coordinates, unless we apply a shift vector.
To define an LPC instance, one starts defining the set M and the map φ; this defines the subset
φ(M) and a shift vector τ such that τ +φ−1(M) is contained in the cone of vectors with non-negative
components. Then we have to choose a lattice L such that its staircase contains τ + φ−1(M) and
Lpub = φ−1(L). Themap φ, being the trapdoor information, has to be chosen in a set that is sufficiently
large; the staircase of L has to contain a n-dimensional rectangle whose sides are the l1 norm of the
columns of the matrix X associated to φ, and for security reasons one wants to have the determinant
of L as small as possible with respect to the volume ofM. This poses some challenges, indeed φ, L and
the term ordering have to be chosen jointly in such a way that L has a staircase that can fit φ(M), and
that L has nevertheless a determinant that is sufficiently ‘‘tight’’ to ensure message security. This is
true both for the construction, where we can decide beforehand φ and build the lattice accordingly,
and for the cryptanalysis, in which we have the lattice Lpub and we try to find φ.
10. Attacks to LPC and key security
With an automorphism of Zn involved, the problem has changed. To recover a private key (or an
equivalent one) looking for a block decomposition of the public key L is useless, since the existing ones
will not give a fat staircase.
To find a private key (either the original or an equivalent one) we need an automorphism φ of Zn
and a block decomposition ofφ(L); using Remark 9we just need to find a filtration (Mi) ofZn that gives
a block decomposition up to an automorphism φ of Zn. This can be made, but we have an additional
constraint: not only do we need a block decomposition, we also need the image ofM = [0, s]n to be
contained in the staircase of the image of L under the automorphism. This implies a bound on φ.
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The first problem is an integer linear algebra problem, hence easy to solve, but the second adds
constraints, hence the problem becomes a hard integer programming problem. For specific (tight)
values of the parameters one might have that φ is not expected to exist for generic lattices, and hence
for an LPC public lattice the solution is expected to be (substantially) unique and hence to coincide
with the private key. Unfortunately we have not been able to prove such a result for the parameters
that we suggest, but we have heuristic evidence supporting this conjecture.
Some of the information useful to find the private filtrationmight be considered known, since they
can be restricted to a small, or at least not prohibitively large, number of cases; these include the size
of the blocks, and the determinant of the diagonal blocks. In particular, the group structure of G = Z/L
can be easily computed, and if it is cyclic or is the sum of a few cyclic groups one might consider that
the subgroups Gi = Mi/Mi∩L ⊆ G are known. This does not mean that in this case the block structure
is known, since recovering the Mi from the Mi/Mi ∩ L in such a way that the map φ is small still
requires solving an SVP. But it could be a good idea to make the reconstruction of the subgroup chain
(Gi) hard; this happens if Z/L has many cyclic factors, and to maximize it, it is useful to use lattices
with determinant power of 2. Experimentally, a large number of cyclic groups inZn/L can be achieved
with a blockmatrix having the determinant power of 2, and the blocks near to the diagonal a multiple
of a power of 2. Hence we may assume that we know the determinants of the blocks that we have to
reconstruct, but not the subgroups Gi, and that an exhaustive search is impossible.
We do not have a formal reduction to a provably hard problem, but this is in common with
most current cryptosystems. Lattice cryptosystems usually enjoy provable security, in the sense that
breaking themmeans breaking all instances of a certain hard problem, but not all of them do, and the
most handy GGH (Goldreich et al., 1997) and NTRU (Hoffstein et al., 1998) do not have this property.
11. Attacks to the block structure
Structure and attacks to the private key. We have shown that it is easy to compute a Gröbner
basis of a block lattice with respect to a block ordering. Such computation is needed for key creation
but it will be easy also for the attacker. It is hence essential for the block structure to bewell hidden. To
recover the block structure is not enough to recover the private key, since one has to choose the term
ordering such that the staircase is sufficiently fat to allow decryption, and not every term-ordering is
suitable. But relying on the secrecy of the term-ordering seems risky, hencewe assume that recovering
the block structure is enough for a total break of the key.
Because of the inductive character of the block structure, we consider that recovering the smallest
block lattice might be a serious blow to the private key. On the other hand it seems unlikely that an
equivalent private key might be built without recovering the smallest block. We will consider mainly
attacks of this kind and try to design the structure in such a way to parry them.
Recover the smallest block. Assume that we have an instance of an LPC, through its public key
(a basis of the public lattice) and message set; we want to reconstruct the matrix X (or an equivalent
one) that gives the private change of variables φ from the public lattice Lpub. We know that X is small,
since the product of its columns times the size of the message space is bounded by the determinant.
We also assume we know the size and determinant of the smallest block, since in any case they are
chosen in a small set (the determinant of the block has to be a factor of the determinant of the lattice).
The rows of the matrix Y = X−1 are the coordinates of the private lattice. Hence abandoning
temporarily the condition on the staircase, and relaxing the condition on the columns of X , the
conditions are:
(1) Y has as rows vectors vi and we know ni such that 2nivi ∈ L.
(2) Y−1 is small (its columns have small norm).
We relax the first condition, considering it for the last rows only, i.e. we aim at finding the last
block.
We consider the second condition as an optimization problem on the set of solutions of the first. It
is a non-linear problem (because of the inverse). But since X = XσXτ and Xτ is the sum of the identity
matrix and a small nilpotent matrix, it can be approximated linearly if we require that Y is small.
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The problem has hence become a lattice problem: find m small linearly independent vectors in
L : d′, wherem is the size of the last block and d′ is its determinant. This can be attackedwith standard
lattice reduction methods.
Of course, the simplified problem is only a heuristic solution, but wewill show experimentally that
it often gives a solution, at least a partial one, in low dimension. We consider it a full solution if the
span of them smallest vectors of the reduced basis is equal to the smallest block, and a partial solution
if the two intersect non trivially. The goodness of a partial solution can bemeasured by the dimension
of the intersection, or by the intersection of the smallest block with the space generated by the cm
smallest vectors for small multiples c.
So in large dimension, when the simplified problem becomes unfeasible with standard lattice
techniques, we may consider breaking the key as unfeasible, at least with this type of attack.
We will discuss the experimental findings in a subsequent section.
12. Suggested parameters and implementation tips
Choosing the blocks.We outline here how we implemented the construction of LPC examples on
which we conducted our tests.
Every block will be of dimension 4, each block except the last one will have determinant 217 and
its staircase will contain (0, 8)3 × (0, 99). The last block will have determinant 213 and the staircase
will contain (0, 8)4. This means that the message space is (0, 8)n and the matrix X can have one every
4 columns (except the last 4) of l1 norm at most 12. All the others will be of l1 norm 1. We need hence
to find many such blocks.
We consider several randommatrices with given determinant (these are found filling randomly 3
columns, and choosing the fourth suitably). Then we compute their DegRevLex Gröbner basis.
For the smallest block, with determinant 213, we discard all the matrices whose staircase is not
8-fat; experimentally, one block every 106 survives. More are found through small deformations, and
we currently have a small collection of several hundred blocks.
For the larger blocks, we first find randommatrices with determinant 215, compute the DegRevLex
Gröbner basis, and discard those that do not have fatness (8, 8, 8, 24) or a permutation. It turns out
that on average we findmore than one in 104 samples. We have built a collection of several thousand.
Then wemultiply the column of each block having fatness 24 by 4; the Gröbner basis with respect
to a suitable ordering (in which the variable that has been multiplied has weight 1/4) is the same,
with the component multiplied by 4, and its fatness is (8, 8, 8, 99).
The choice of a power of 2 as determinant is suggested to maximize the number of subgroups of
Zn/L, and the exponent are chosen as small as possible: the staircase of the last block has at least
94 = 6561 elements, that of the other blocks has at least 100 · 93 = 72 900, and the determinants are
8192 and 131 072 respectively. So the choices are tight.
In the construction of the full block matrix we may ensure that Zn/L is far from cyclic. To this end
we require that the elements of the tails of the blocks that are nearer to the diagonal are multiples of
a power of 2. For example, if the first 16 elements of every tail are multiples of 4, one experimentally
expects to have, in a lattice of 50 blocks (and dimension 200), 2120 elements in Zn/L of order dividing
213, instead of the 213 of a cyclic group. Identifying the subgroup corresponding to the smallest block
seems hard.
The block structure outlined allows thematrix X to haveweight 12 in one out of 4 columns,making
exhaustive search attacks on X impossible.
Public key, encryption. We represent the public key as a reduced Lex Gröbner basis, an upper
triangular matrix with non-positive entries off the diagonal, substantially equivalent to the Hermite
normal form.
Encryption of amessage, in this case, can be defined as a Lex normal form. Namely, if d1, d2, . . . , dn
are the values on the diagonal of the matrix in Hermite normal form, a cryptogram is represented by
a vector c1, c2, . . . , cn with 0 ≤ ci < di. In particular the bit length of a cryptogram is the bit length ld
of the determinant
∏
di. The bit length of the public key is nld. Considering the proposed parameters,
each block (except the first) has determinant of bit length 17; while the message has bit length 12.68
per block. This means that we have message expansion 1.34.
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Decryption: Normal form in lattices. Normal form modulo a Gröbner basis can be computed
through Buchberger division, but for lattices it is inefficient,and should be used as a last resort;
in the univariate case this corresponds to computing integer division remainder through repeated
subtraction.
Moreover, it can only be used for vectors without negative components, if a vector hasmixed signs
one has first to find an equivalent vector without negative components.
In lattices, one can use a different procedure: for a vector v, find a lattice vector l that is sufficiently
near to v; the normal form of v and of v − l are the same. Hence we proceed as follows:
• choose a vectorw sufficiently small with positive components.
• choose an approximate closest lattice vector l for u = v − w.
• if u+w has no negative component, compute the normal form u′ of u+ l via Buchberger division,
otherwise choose a largerw.
This might be a problem if the lattice is large, but we will show now that to find the normal form
in block lattices it is enough to compute the normal form for the blocks.
Assume now that we have a block lattice, and that we have computed, for every diagonal block, its
Gröbner basis.
Remark that having a basis B = (bi) of a lattice, a vector v and its normal formw, one can compute
via linear algebra the coefficients ai such thatw = v −∑ aibi.
To compute the normal form of a full vector v, we operate inductively on the head. Let v = v′+v′′
being head and tail respectively; let B be the set of the rows of the blockmatrix having the head in the
same block as v, let B′ be the corresponding diagonal block.
Find the normal form w′ of v′ with respect to the block Gröbner basis of B′, and let A = (ai) be
the coefficients as above. Thenw = v − AB is a vector whose headw′ can no longer be reduced; find
inductively the normal formw′′ ofw − w′, thenw′ + w′′ is the normal form of v.
The result is the normal form, since it is inside of the staircase and equivalent to v mod L.
13. Implementation and experiments
We have implemented the cryptosystem and the attacks three times. A first prototype has been
implemented in CoCoA, (CoCoATeam, 2009). This implementation has been used for experimentswith
more general types of LPC, and for comparisons. A Lisp and a C++ implementation has been hence
developed. The Lisp implementation has been used to test and develop the algorithms, while the C++
implementation has been used for speed.
All rely on Shoup’s NTL (Shoup, 2009) for the LLL, BKZ and standard lattice algorithms, and 4ti2,
(4ti2 team, 2009) for the lattice Gröbner basis algorithms.
The C++ implementation has been made by Daniele Trainini in a stage for the degree in Computer
Science.
Sizes, complexity and timings.We can estimate quite accurately the size of the public and private
keys, and the complexity of encryption and decryption. As parameter we take the number of the
blocks.
A public key withm blocks is an n× nmatrix (n = 4m) of determinant 217m−4 in Hermite normal
form. This means in particular that every row of the matrix is a sequence of integers whose global bit
length is bounded by 17m. The size of the key is hence 68m2. A key with 64 blocks (the minimal size
that we consider secure) has size 35 KB, one with 256 blocks has size 0.5 MB.
The size of the private key is not much larger, but has size only marginally larger, with the same
asymptotic growth: the private lattice is an n × n matrix of small integers, the Gröbner basis of
each block has approximately the same size, (estimated at most 50 elements per block), the private
coordinate change is another n × n matrix of small integers. The decryption time too can only be
estimated, but it is cubic inm, and apparently about 6 times the encryption time.
The message expansion rate is 1.34, as remarked in 12, although for security reasons that will be
discussed later a subset of messages only might be used, bringing the message expansion rate up to 3.
These are the times needed for the key preparation, encryption and decryption for an LPC as
described above, not including the preliminary preparation of the blocks, in the C++ implementation.
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The times are in seconds, the largest part of the preparation time is the HNF computation to obtain
the public key.
Dimension Creation Encrypt Decrypt
128 0.79 s 0.00054 s 0.00267 s
192 3.4 s6 0.00120 s 0.00558 s
256 10.46 s 0.00228 s 0.0123 s
384 58.09 s 0.00622 s 0.0279 s
512 192.48 s 0.01070 s 0.0559 s
768 1195.71 s 0.02370 s 0.130 s
1024 4658.14 s 0.04160 s 0.345 s
These timings (in seconds) are averages of 1000 runs on an Intel Core 2 Duo E6750@ 2.66 GHz running
GNU/Linux Ubuntu 7.10.
Message attacks.Messages can be attacked through a closest vector problem. Since a message m
is a vector in [0, 8], and is encrypted as c = m + v, v ∈ L where L is the lattice whose basis is the
public key, the vector v can be (presumably) retrieved as the closest vector to (4, 4, . . . , 4).
We have used the nearest plane algorithm (Babai, 1986), using a BKZ-reduced basis of the lattice.
As starting basis of the lattice reduction we have tested either the public key, or the block lattice in
public coordinates. The latter basis has proved to be more efficient, but is of course unavailable to an
attacker: the lattice is always the same, but the reduction starting from the private basis gives a better
reduced basis than starting from the HNF (i.e. the public basis).
We have tested several variants of messages, reducing the range of the vector: (1) The set
{0, 1, 7, 8}; (2) the set {0, 1, 2, 6, 7, 8}. (3) the full interval [0, 8]; (4) The set {1, 2, 6, 7}; (5) The
interval [1, 7]; (6) The interval [2, 6]; (7) The interval [3, 5]; varying the number of blocks. We report
the number of successes in cracking 100 randommessages each for 10 different random LPC.
BKZ from the public key BKZ from the private key
Dim 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
40 926 952 924 999 998 1000 1000 920 933 937 996 1000 1000 1000
60 889 912 874 993 995 1000 1000 884 931 880 996 995 1000 1000
80 855 897 848 995 993 1000 1000 846 892 841 991 995 1000 1000
100 119 120 112 272 284 706 992 389 433 397 566 566 856 1000
120 0 0 0 3 7 147 892 0 0 1 14 14 278 950
140 0 0 0 0 0 14 590 0 0 0 0 0 9 603
160 0 0 0 0 0 0 144 0 0 0 0 0 1 173
180 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 16
200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
We see from these data that reducing the range of messages makes them much more vulnerable,
and instead using only the extreme range makes themmore robust. An important part of the security
is using a public key very far from a reduced lattice; starting near to the private key allows one to
obtain a better reduced basis, increasing the successful attacks in some marginal situation.
Our conclusion is that for more than 50 blocks, i.e. lattice dimension 200 ormore, themessages are
secure with the current state of the art. Whether for such lengths the messages have to be restricted
to the extreme values has not been concluded.
A further discussion comparing themethodwith the security estimates of other known cryptosys-
tems will be done in Section 14.
Key attacks.We have tried the key attack to the smallest block; the attack has varying success for
small block numbers, but always fails for 40 blocks or more, since the lattice reduction algorithm
fails to detect vectors sufficiently small, and the space generated by the shortest vectors found is
substantially random.
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We measure the success reporting, for 100 LPC instances of each length, the dimension of the
intersection of the smallest block with the 4, 8, 12 smallest vectors of the reduced basis. The time
is in seconds needed to perform one attack.
4 8 12
Dim 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4 Time
40 0 2 14 51 33 0 0 3 19 78 0 0 1 10 89 1.5 s
60 1 6 18 51 24 0 1 4 27 68 0 0 2 17 81 5 s
80 5 15 29 36 15 2 8 20 37 33 0 1 10 35 54 12 s
100 2 23 28 35 12 1 7 20 37 35 1 5 11 31 52 38 s
120 15 24 29 28 4 13 18 20 29 20 13 15 16 27 29 149 s
140 76 22 1 0 1 76 21 2 0 1 76 21 2 0 1 482 s
Our interpretation of the data is that not only the cost of the attack increases exponentially, but
it becomes less and less effective when the dimension increases, since the linear approximation
becomes less and less valid. The assumption that breaking the key is equivalent to solving the hard
non-linear optimization problem is substantially confirmed.
Our conclusion is that for more than 50 blocks, i.e. lattice dimension 200 or more, the private key
is presumably secure with the current state of the art.
See http://posso.dm.unipi.it/crypto for more documentation and challenges.
14. Other lattice cryptosystems, security analysis of LPC
Lattice Polly Cracker is similar tomembers of the Polly Cracker family, but also shares several traits
with other lattice cryptosystems.
The encryption method of LPC (adding a lattice element to a message or, dually, encrypting a
message that is a lattice element adding some small ‘‘noise’’ to it) is the standardmethod in lattice and
in error correcting code cryptosystems. Their message security lies in the difficulty of solving a closest
vector problem (CVP) in lattices, or in linear error-correcting codes, where the Hamming distance is
used instead of the Euclidean distance. See Nguyen and Stern (2001) for an overview.
The main cryptosystems of possibly practical interest in these families are GGH, (Goldreich et al.,
1997), NTRU, (Hoffstein et al., 1998) and McEliece–Niederreiter (McEliece, 1978; Niederreiter, 1986).
All of them can be described as cryptosystems in which a small vector is added to an element of the
lattice, and the message is retrieved through some trapdoor information. The message is either the
small vector or the lattice element, but since finding one determines the other the two are equivalent.
They differ in the mechanism of the trapdoor and in the definition of ‘‘small’’.
• In GGH, the trapdoor is a quasi-orthogonal lattice basis and for a vector to be ‘‘small’’ means that
the absolute value of every component is fixed (so it is small in l∞ norm);• in NTRU, the trapdoor is a small vector in the lattice, and ‘‘smallness’’ is measured both in l∞ norm
and in the Hamming weight;
• in McEliece, the trapdoor is a Goppa code structure, i.e. a key equation in a different basis, and
‘‘smallness’’ is defined in the Hamming weight.
In LPC, the trapdoor information is a fat block structure in a homomorphic, non-isometric lattice,
and the ‘‘smallness’’ is measured in l∞ metric. Hence LPC is almost identical to GGH from the public
point of view. So as far as message security is concerned we may rely on the analysis of GGH.
From the public point of view the two look the same, the only visible difference is that with our
choice of parameters the determinant of a LPC lattice is always a power of 2.
At closer inspection, however, one sees that a GGH public key is a lattice with a much larger
determinant: for a GGH lattice of dimension n the determinant is approximately (4n
√
n)n, while for
LPC the determinant is approximately 19n, that is smaller for n ≥ 3. Representing the public lattice
in Hermite normal form, if d is the determinant, and n the dimension, requires n log2(d) bits, so for
example, for n = 200, a GGH public key is more than 3 times larger than an LPC public key (21.25 KB
vs. 67 KB).With a smaller key, the encryption is simpler and themessage expansion ismoremoderate.
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Moreover, LPC can encode and decode deterministically amessagewith elements of range 9, (from
0 to 8, or equivalently from −4 to 4), while GGH can encode and decode with estimated failure rate
10−5 a vector of range 7 (from−3 to 3). Thismeans that for vectors of the same length, LPC not only has
a lattice of much smaller determinant, but can transmit vectors of larger range that are more secure.
The GGH vectors can only take values in {−3, 3}, a more reduced range is not considered secure
enough. For comparison, the vectors allowed for LPC can be taken with values in {−4,−3, 3, 4}, with
better security. Thismeans that the estimates given in Goldreich et al. (1997) on the cost of the attacks
to a GGH message can apply unchanged as a lower bound to the same attacks to LPC.
We remark that GGH has been broken with an attack of Nguyen (1999) that exploits the fact that a
GGH vector is constant mod 6. The same attack does not apply to LPC, which does not have this flaw.
A comparisonwith NTRU is more difficult; the NTRU lattice has a cyclic structure and a polynomial
representation that produces smaller public keys, moreover all the computations can be performed
with machine integers, hence with considerable performance advantages that are difficult to match.
We are currently studying the possibility of using machine integers in a large part of the LPC
computations to improve the performance
15. Conclusions and future work
We have shown a cryptosystem, based on lattices and using Gröbner bases for decryption, along
the lines of the Polly Cracker cryptosystems. Encryption is similar to other lattice cryptosystems, and
shares with them problems and remedies, as well as the feature of being immune (up to now) to
quantum computing attacks.
Being exempt from the differential attack, messages appear to be secure. The basic scheme is not
secure, but the addition of a change of coordinates seems to guarantee a reasonable level of security
with a relatively short key. Computational experiences confirm this belief.
The construction of LPC has started to respond to a challenge of Barkee et al. (1994): Why You
Cannot Even Hope to use Gröbner bases in Public Key Cryptography: An Open Letter to a Scientist Who
Failed and a Challenge to Those Who Have Not Yet Failed.
Quoting from that paper:
‘‘And now the challenge. (. . . ) ’’
‘‘The high complexity of Gröbner bases is in fact strictly related with the existence of
polynomials in an idealwhoseminimal degree representation in terms of a given basis is doubly
exponential in the degree of the basis elements, Since such polynomials cannot be used as
encoded messages, a cryptographic scheme applying the complexity of Gröbner bases to an
ideal membership problem is bound to fail.’’
‘‘Is our reader able to find a scheme which overcomes this difficulty?’’
‘‘In particular our reader could think (perhaps with some reason) that a sparse scheme could
work. We believe (perhaps without reason) that sparsity will make the scheme easier to crack.
We would be glad to test or belief on specific sparse schemes.’’
While LPC has shown that Gröbner bases can be used in the construction of public key
cryptosystems, that apparently cannot be broken trivially, and perform quite reasonably compared
with other lattice cryptosystems, definitely it is not a cryptosystem applying the complexity of
Gröbner bases. Indeed, the simple version of LPC has been cracked, just exploiting the possibility of
computing easily a Lex Gröbner basis in some specific classes, i. e. a Hermite normal form.
Future work will be concentrated on tying the hardness of finding a ‘‘good’’ (i.e. manageable and
sufficiently fat) Gröbner basis, or a change of coordinates and a good Gröbner basis, to hard lattice
problems, and developing a signature protocol for LPC.
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